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DEARLY DEPARTED: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
DEPARTURE BAR UNDER MENDIOLA V. HOLDER AND
WILLIAM V. GONZALES
Daniel E. Bonilla

I.

*

INTRODUCTION

On April 29, 2009, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) of1
ficials removed then-green-card holder Vakhtang Pruidze based on a
2
state conviction for possession of a controlled substance. Thirteen
days later, the state court set aside the conviction, and Pruidze moved
3
4
to reopen his removal proceedings. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or “Board”), however, denied the motion because Pruidze
no longer physically resided in the United States, and thus the BIA
5
held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion. Ultimately, however, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the

*

J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2005,
University of Louisville. I would like to thank Professor Lori Nessel for her guidance
throughout the development of this Comment, Megan Bedell for her invaluable suggestions and assistance, and the Law Review members who helped prepare this
Comment for publication.
1
Until the passing of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996, the term “deportation” referred to aliens who had been
removed from the country. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-587–89
(1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C. (2006)); see Jennifer M.
Chacon, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 140 n.28
(2009). IIRIRA consolidated the then-separate “exclusion” and “deportation” proceedings under one all-encompassing label of “removal” proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. §
1324c(e) (2006); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1546(a), 1015(e)–(f) (2006).
2
Pruidze v. Holder, 632 F.3d 234, 235 (6th Cir. 2011).
3
“A motion to reopen is based on ‘facts or evidence not available at the time of
the original decision’ [and] must be supported by affidavits or other evidence.”
RACHEL E. ROSENBLOOM ET AL., CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND INT’L JUSTICE AT BOSTON
COLL., POST-DEPARTURE MOTIONS TO REOPEN OR RECONSIDER 2 (2010)(quoting Patel v.
Ashcroft,
378
F.3d
610,
612
(7th
Cir.
2004)),
available
at
http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/humanrights/pdf/MTRPracticeAdv
isory2010FINAL_APPENDIX.pdf ; see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B) (2006).
4
Pruidze, 632 F.3d at 235.
5
Id.
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BIA cannot constrict its statutory jurisdiction based on the Attorney
6
General’s regulations or its own decisions.
On May 7, 2004, the BIA, within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction,
granted Rafael Martinez Coyt thirty days to depart the United States
7
voluntarily. By fault of his former attorney, however, Coyt did not
8
learn of the court’s ruling until October 2004. After being removed,
Coyt filed a motion for the BIA to reissue the decision in order to
9
grant a new voluntary departure period. The BIA denied the motion
on grounds that Coyt’s motion had been withdrawn once he de10
After reviewing the regulation at issue, the
parted the country.
Ninth Circuit held that a motion is not withdrawn when the alien has
11
been involuntarily removed.
On April 9, 2009, DHS officials removed Jesus Contreras12
Bocanegra after the BIA denied his motion to cancel his removal.
Thereafter, Contreras filed a timely motion to reopen based on inef13
fective assistance of counsel. Once again, the BIA denied Contreras’s motion; this time, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction due
14
to his departure. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that based on
its prior rulings, the regulation at issue divests the BIA of jurisdiction
15
to entertain such motions, even when they are timely.
The above-referenced cases are only three examples of how different circuit courts of appeals interpret post-departure bars under
the Code of Federal Regulations. For example, immigrants who have
been subjected to removal proceedings in New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Indiana, or Maryland, but are currently residing in another
country, are permitted to file motions to reopen regardless of whether they are currently the subject of removal proceedings or whether
16
the U.S. government has already removed them. Even immigrants
6

Id. at 237–38.
Coyt v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902, 903–04 (9th Cir. 2010).
8
Id. at 904.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 907.
12
Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1170, 1170–71 (10th Cir. 2010).
13
Id. at 1171.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 1172.
16
The Third Circuit, which includes New Jersey, held that the regulatory postdeparture bar conflicts with Congress’s clear intent regarding motions to reopen.
Espinal v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 653 F.3d 213, 224 (3d Cir. 2011). The Second Circuit, of
which New York is a part, has held that the BIA cannot constrict its own jurisdiction.
7

BONILLA_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

2/15/2012 6:17 PM

COMMENT

277

who have been subjected to removal proceedings in Alaska but are
currently living in another country, so long as their removal was involuntarily and/or they are not currently subject to removal proceed17
ings, may file a motion to reopen. Unfortunately, the regulatory
departure bar under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) prohibits immigrants who
have been subjected to removal proceedings in Maine, Texas, Colorado, or Florida, among other states, from moving to reopen their
18
proceedings once they have departed the country. This Comment
sets forth that such inconsistent interpretations of federal law and
regulations threaten to undermine the important concepts of uniformity and just application of the law in American jurisprudence.
The lack of uniformity in application of the departure bar is of
increasing concern due to the growing annual number of removed
19
aliens in recent years. In fiscal year 2010, 392,862 aliens were re20
21
moved, more than double the number of removals in 1999. The
Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 100 (2d Cir. 2011). The court in Luna, however, limited its holding to statutory motions. Id. at 102. Ohio is located within the Sixth
Circuit’s jurisdiction and permits aliens to file motions to reopen their proceedings
after they have departed because the court has ruled that the BIA cannot constrict its
statutory jurisdiction by regulations or its own decisions. Pruidze v. Holder, 632 F.3d
234, 235, 237–38 (6th Cir. 2011). Indiana, which is within the Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction, permits aliens to file motions to reopen or reconsider for the same reasons articulated by the Sixth Circuit. Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 591, 595
(7th Cir. 2010). Maryland, which is within the Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction, permits
aliens to file motions to reopen pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) regardless of
whether they are physically present in the United States. William v. Gonzales, 499
F.3d 329, 333 (4th Cir. 2007).
17
Alaska, which falls within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction, permits an alien to
reopen a case pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) if the alien moves to reopen after
the removal order is final or after being involuntarily removed. Coyt v. Holder, 593
F.3d 902, 905–07 (9th Cir. 2010); Lin v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 2007).
18
Each state falls under the jurisdictions of the First, Fifth, Tenth, or Eleventh
Circuits, respectively. See Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1170, 1173 (10th
Cir. 2010); Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303, 1311 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 502 (2010); Ovalles v. Holder, 577 F.3d 288, 295–96 (5th Cir. 2009) (relying on
Navarro-Miranda v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 2003)); Sankar v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
284 F. App’x 798, 799 (11th Cir. 2008); Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 438, 441–
42 (1st Cir. 2007); Ablahad v. Gonzales, 217 F. App’x 470, 475 n.6 (6th Cir. 2007).
19
See generally Christina LaBrie, Lack of Uniformity in the Deportation of Criminal
Aliens, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 357 (1999) (describing different aspects of
the interplay between federal immigration law and state criminal law).
20
Stephen Dinan, More Criminal Aliens Deported Last Year, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 6,
2010, at A1; see also Anthony M. DeStefano, Deportations Rise Under Obama, NEWSDAY,
Aug. 2, 2010, at A32.
21
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2008 YEARBOOK OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 95 (2009)(noting that there were 183,114 deportations in
1999),
available
at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/
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continuous increase in the number of immigrants removed each year
emphasizes the significant implications stemming from the fact that
immigrants unfortunate enough to have resided in particular states in
the United States will be forever barred from reopening their cases,
despite valid grounds for doing so.
The situation is further compounded by the fact that most crim22
inal convictions result in mandatory detention. Such a practice, in
conjunction with the rising number of deportations, raises new concerns. For example, in Mendiola v. Holder, DHS officials transferred
the petitioner, Mendiola, to an immigration detention facility in
23
another circuit court’s jurisdiction. The immigration judge (IJ) de24
nied Mendiola’s motion for a change of venue, and, ultimately, the
court denied his motion to reopen due to the regulatory postdeparture bar, which deprived the court of jurisdiction to hear the
25
motion. This practice implicates serious concerns for aliens facing
removal proceedings in this country because DHS officials, or Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents, can transfer an alien
26
to a jurisdiction that is more favorable to their position; as a practic27
al matter, DHS officials can engage in forum shopping.
In order to ensure that litigants are afforded adequate legal protections, the Legislature has created several safeguards in the judicial
system. For instance, the United States Supreme Court recently

2008/ois_yb_2008.pdf. See generally Lenni B. Benson, Making Paper Dolls: How Restrictions on Judicial Review and the Administrative Process Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37 (2007) (discussing how litigation has increased
in light of Congress’s narrowing and elimination of prior forms of relief).
22
See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of
Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 389 (2002) (“Furthermore, Congress has
ordered the mandatory detention of most non-citizens whose criminal convictions
render them deportable.”).
23
Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303, 1305 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 502 (2010); Mendiola v. Gonzales, 189 F. App’x 810, 812 (10th Cir. 2006).
24
Mendiola, 189 F. App’x at 812.
25
Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1311.
26
Id.
27
See RICHARD L. SKINNER, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES RELATED TO DETAINEE TRANSFERS 1
(2009)(“ICE transfers detainees to other detention facilities to prepare for final removal, reduce overcrowding, or meet the specialized needs of the detainee.”), available
at
http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?bc=1016%7C6715%7C
16871%7C31048%7C30690 . An alien’s counsel may also engage in forum shopping,
as noted by Judge Bea of the Ninth Circuit. Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing
on H.R. 109-537 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 8 (2006) (statement of
the Honorable Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judge, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals).
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noted in Kucana v. Holder that “[t]he motion to reopen is an ‘important safeguard’ intended ‘to ensure a proper and lawful disposition’
28
of immigration proceedings.” Courts should not subject such an
important legal right to chance—a chance that a deportable alien
lives in a jurisdiction that permits him or her to file a motion to reopen after departing the country. Because “this conflict involves an is29
sue of significant practical importance,” it is imperative that the
immigration courts provide uniformity in the application of the regulatory departure bar throughout the country.
It is also clear that Congress’s intent in enacting the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
30
(IIRIRA) and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA)
was to make motions to reopen available to immigrants inside and
31
outside of the country.
This Comment proposes that Congress
should modify the INA to include language clearly indicating that an
alien’s geographic location at the time of filing of a motion to reopen
or reconsider removal proceedings should not bar the immigration
courts of jurisdiction to hear such motions. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that amending the INA’s statutory language to explicitly grant immigration courts the jurisdiction to consider an alien’s
motion to reopen regardless of whether the alien is within or without
the country would provide uniformity in this context by resolving the
current circuit conflicts while also remaining true to the IIRIRA’s statutory purpose. Part II of this Comment begins with background information on the history of immigration law in the United States by
discussing the INA before the IIRIRA’s enactment in 1996. Part III
focuses on the state of immigration law after the IIRIRA’s enactment.
In Part IV, this Comment provides a brief overview of three BIA cases,
each of which address different departure bar issues. This Part provides insight into some of the background matters that are analyzed
in the circuit cases discussed throughout this Comment. Part V analyzes the Fourth Circuit’s William v. Gonzales and the Ninth Circuit’s
28

130 S. Ct. 827, 834 (2010) (quoting Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 18 (2008)).
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 20, Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303 (10th
Cir. 2009) (No. 08-9565), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2010/07/09-1378_pet.pdf.
30
Pub. L. No. 82-414, ch. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C. (2006)).
31
See Reyes-Torres v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (“‘The intent
of Congress is clear’ in that ‘Congress anticipated that petitioners would be able to
pursue relief after departing from the United States.’” (quoting Coyt v. Holder, 593
F.3d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 2010))).
29
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recent decision in Mendiola v. Holder. In addition, this Part illustrates
the lack of uniformity in U.S. circuit courts of appeals by noting the
differences in departure bar jurisprudence found in several different
cases. Then, Part VI provides an argument for modification or abolishment of the regulatory departure bars. Lastly, Part VII discusses
possible solutions to the lack of uniformity by proposing an amendment to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) that would render all currently
phrased regulatory departure bars invalid and thus inapplicable to
departed aliens who file motions to reopen their proceedings.
II. THE HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION LAW BEFORE IIRIRA
This Comment provides the historical background behind the
origins of the regulatory departure bars to better illustrate their current varying interpretations. Congress enacted the first general immigration statute in 1882, which “imposed a head tax of 50 cents [per
immigrant] and excluded idiots, lunatics, convicts, and persons likely
32
to become a public charge.” Also in 1882, Congress passed the con33
troversial Chinese Exclusion Act. A codification of the general im34
migration law occurred in 1891, and by 1893, Congress enacted a
provision for the establishment of boards to determine the admissibil35
ity of arriving immigrants. By 1903, the legislature revised the statutory provisions to enumerate rejections of certain types of immi36
In 1907, Congress added additional exclusions for the
grants.
feebleminded and persons who had committed crimes involving
37
moral turpitude, among others. Essentially, Congress aimed to dis32

CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.02[2] (2010);
see Act of Aug. 3, 1882, 22 Stat. 214.
33
Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, repealed by the Magnuson Act, ch.
344, § 1, 57 Stat. 600 (1943) (prohibiting the immigration of Chinese Laborers in the
United States); see Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and
the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 29 (1998) (“The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was the first Asian Exclusion Law, and the one that generated the
most contemporary controversy.”).
34
While Congress and different states had already enacted legislation relating to
immigration prior to 1891, see Sheila Jackson Lee, Why Immigration Reform Requires a
Comprehensive Approach that Includes Both Legalization Programs and Provisions to Secure
the Border, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 267, 268–69 (2006), the codification in 1891 “provided the first general immigration law applying to all aliens entering the United
States,” Marian L. Smith, The INS and the Singular Status of North American Indians, 21
AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RESEARCH J. 131, 146 (1997).
35
See GORDON ET AL., supra note 32.
36
See Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213 (repealed 1907) (excluding
epileptics, insane persons, professional beggars, and anarchists, among others).
37
See Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 2, 34 Stat. 898.
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allow certain types of individuals whom Congress deemed to be of
unsound mind or character from entering the United States.
Also in 1907, Congress created the Dillingham Commission to
38
investigate the immigration system of the United States. Although
the commission’s report included recommendations to improve the
country’s immigration system, Congress did not adopt any such legislation until 1917, when it passed a comprehensive revision of the
39
immigration laws over the veto of President Wilson. This comprehensive revision expanded the powers of immigration officers and
40
conferred discretionary authority to admit certain barred groups.
After World War I ended in 1918, immigration began to rise in the
United States, with some years registering over a million immigrants
41
per year. This influx of immigrants ultimately resulted in the Quota
42
Law of 1921.
The Acts of 1917 and 1921 were the primary components of
immigration policy until the Alien Registration Act of 1940, which
43
expanded the Attorney General’s power. This Act delegated to the
Attorney General “broad authority to establish rules and regulations
44
to enforce the nation’s immigration laws.” Pursuant to regulations,
the Attorney General established the BIA in 1940; the regulations
“authorized the Board to ‘issue orders of deportation’; ‘consider and
determine appeals’; and resolve motions for ‘reconsideration, reargument or reopening of a case after the issuance of a final deci45
sion.’” Then, in 1952, Congress enacted the INA, also known as the

38

See GORDON ET AL., supra note 32, § 2.02[2].
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Act of May 19, 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-5, 42 Stat. 5 (placing numerical limitations
on how many immigrants of certain nationalities could be permitted in the United
States), repealed by Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163, 279 (1952).
43
Alien Registration Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 670 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. (2006)), amended by Internal Security Act
of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987.
44
Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 661 (2d Cir. 2010).
45
Id. at 654–55; see Regulations Governing Departmental Organization and Authority, 5 Fed. Reg. 3502, 3503 (Sept. 4, 1940). In 1913, the immigration-related federal agency established in 1891
was transferred to the newly created Department of Labor and divided
into the Bureau of Immigration and the Bureau of Naturalization. The
two bureaus were combined in 1933 . . . and . . . named the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) . . . . [In] March 2003, the functions of the INS were transferred to DHS.
39
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46

McCarran-Walter Act.
The INA further expanded the Attorney
General’s authority by granting the Attorney General the power to
47
administer and enforce the Act. It also “authorized him to ‘establish
such regulations . . . as he deem[ed] necessary for carrying out [that]
48
authority.’” Subsequently, the “Attorney General promulgated a series of regulations defining the ‘[a]ppellate jurisdiction’ of the BIA
49
and the ‘[p]owers of the Board.’” Regulations promulgated at this
time included motions to reopen and motions for reconsideration of
50
Board decisions. More importantly, these regulations also included
the first version of the regulatory departure bar, which stated that
“[a] motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not be made
by or on behalf of a person who is the subject of deportation pro51
ceedings subsequent to his departure from the United States.”
In the 1954 case In re G-y-B, the BIA upheld the departure bar as
a jurisdictional limitation of its power to consider a motion to reo52
pen. The Board’s holding clearly validated the regulatory departure
bar. Then, in 1958, the Attorney General revised the regulations to
include sua sponte authority for the BIA to reopen proceedings and
53
reconsider its own decisions.
Congress also made changes by
amending the INA in 1961 to include provisions relating to judicial

Zhang, 617 F.3d at 655 n.3 (internal citations omitted). The provisions established
under the Alien Registration Act were further enlarged by the Internal Security Act
of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987 (codified as amended in scattered
section of 50 U.S.C.).
46
Pub. L. No. 82-414, ch. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C.). The Act was co-named after its sponsors Senator Pat McCarran and
Congressman Francis Walter. Richard Boswell, Immigration Law: Crafting True Immigration Reform, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 7, 8–9 (2008).
47
Zhang, 617 F.3d at 655.
48
8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2006); Zhang, 617 F.3d at 655 (quoting § 103(a), 66 Stat. at
173).
49
Zhang, 617 F.3d at 655 (quoting Immigration and Nationality Regulations, 17
Fed. Reg. 11,469, 11,475 (Dec. 19, 1952) (final rule codified at 8 C.F.R. § 6.1(b), (d)
(1952)).
50
8 C.F.R. § 6.2 (1952); see Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656 n.4.
51
§ 6.2; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (2011) (containing an identical current limit
on motions to reopen and reconsider exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings before the BIA); id. § 1003.23(b)(1)(containing an identical current limit on
motions to reopen and reconsider exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings
before an IJ); Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656.
52
6 I. & N. Dec. 159, 160 (B.I.A. 1954).
53
Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656.
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54

review of BIA decisions. One such provision modeled the regulatory
departure bar and stated that “[a]n order of deportation or of exclusion shall not be reviewed by any court if the alien . . . has departed
55
from the United States after the issuance of the order.” Congress’s
56
amendment codified the departure bar.
The Attorney General’s regulations pertaining to motions to
57
reopen remained unchanged until the Immigration Act of 1990.
This Act authorized the Attorney General to
issue regulations with respect to . . . the period of time in which
motions to reopen . . . may be offered in deportation proceedings, which regulations [should] include a limitation on the
number of such motions that may be filed and a maximum time
58
period for the filing of such motions.

Ultimately, the Attorney General followed this directive and promulgated regulations that permitted aliens to file only “one motion to
59
reopen within 90 days.” The revised regulations, however, retained
60
the IJ and the BIA’s sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings.
III. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRATION LAW AFTER THE IIRIRA
In 1996, Congress enacted the IIRIRA, which codified “some—
but not all—of the Attorney General’s 1996 regulations regarding
61
motions to reopen.” Included within the statute were the Attorney
General’s regulatory numerical and temporal limitations for motions
62
to reopen or reconsider. Congress, however, did not include the
departure bar or regulations that granted sua sponte authority to the
63
IJ and BIA in the statute. Instead, the IIRIRA repealed the originally codified departure bar in such a manner that an alien’s departure

54
Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 650 (repealed 1996); see
Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656.
55
8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1964) (repealed 1996); see Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656.
56
Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656; see § 1105a(c).
57
Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 545(d)(1), 104 Stat. 4978 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §1252b
(repealed 1996)); see Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656.
58
§ 545(d)(1), 104 Stat. at 5066; see also Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656.
59
Zhang, 617 F.3d at 657 (quoting Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 13 (2008)).
60
8 C.F.R. §§ 3.2(a), 3.23(b)(1) (2000); see also Zhang, 617 F.3d at 657.
61
Zhang, 617 F.3d at 657.
62
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2006) (stating that “[a]n alien may file one motion
to reopen proceedings under this section,” which must generally be filed “within 90
days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal”). For the text of
the current departure bar see infra Part VII.
63
Zhang, 617 F.3d at 657.
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from the United States no longer foreclosed that alien’s legal ability
64
to seek judicial review of a BIA order.
The Attorney General specifically addressed the IIRIRA’s repeal
of the INA’s codified departure bar by promulgating new regulations
on March 6, 1997, which included both a departure bar and sua
65
sponte authority for the BIA to consider motions to reopen. According to the Attorney General, “‘[n]o provision of the [IIRIRA]
supports reversing the long established rule that a motion to reopen . . . cannot be made in immigration proceedings by or on behalf
66
of a person after that person’s departure from the United States.’”
These regulations, promulgated by the Attorney General, are still in
effect today. Congress, however, has not amended the statutory language in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A) or 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) to
include these regulations or any jurisdictional bar to considering motions to reopen or reconsider by aliens after they have departed from
the county.
IV. BIA’S REGULATORY DEPARTURE BAR JURISPRUDENCE
In order to understand the reasoning behind the BIA’s departure bar holdings in subsequent circuit court of appeals opinions, this
Part will briefly highlight three major BIA cases analyzing postdeparture bars.
A. In re G-y-B
In 1954, the Board in In re G-y-B upheld the first version of the
67
1952 regulatory post-departure bar. The IJ originally excluded the
petitioner under the INA on grounds that he was affiliated with the
68
Communist party of a foreign state. Thus, on August 14, 1953, petitioner departed the country and subsequently filed a motion to reo69
pen and reconsider on November 24, 1953. Although the petitioner
included new facts to support his claim that he should not have been
excluded, the Board ruled that it was “without jurisdiction to act on

64

Id.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 (2011) (originally codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(a), (d)
(1997)); see also id. §§ 1003.2(d), 1003.23(b)(1); Zhang, 617 F.3d at 657.
66
Zhang, 617 F.3d at 657 (quoting 62 Fed. Reg. at 10,312).
67
6 I. & N. Dec. 159, 160 (B.I.A. 1954); see also Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656.
68
In re G-y-B, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 159.
69
Id.
65
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the motion.” The Board applied the post-departure bar under 8
71
C.F.R. § 6.12, which in pertinent part stated,
Departure from the United States of a person who is the subject
of deportation proceedings subsequent to the taking of an appeal
but prior to a decision thereon shall constitute a withdrawal of the
appeal and the initial decision in the case shall be final to the
72
same extent as though no appeal had been taken.

For this reason, the Board dismissed petitioner’s motions.

73

B. In re Armendarez-Mendez
The Board continued upholding its ruling in In re G-y-B
throughout the years. In 2008, the BIA once again upheld its
longstanding application of the regulatory departure bar in In re Ar74
mendarez-Mendez. Government officials removed respondent from
75
the United States on December 11, 2000. Then, nearly five and onehalf years later, respondent filed a motion for the court to reopen his
76
proceedings sua sponte. Having found the departure bar in 8 C.F.R.
77
§ 1003.2(d) applicable, the Board denied his motion. Respondent
78
subsequently filed a petition of review to the Fifth Circuit. In light
79
of the holding in the Ninth Circuit’s case Lin v. Gonzales, the Fifth
Circuit remanded respondent’s matter to the BIA to consider the
80
questions raised in his case.
On remand, in a lengthy opinion, the Board detailed the history
and analyzed the different interpretations of the regulatory departure
bar and the validity of the regulation as applied in different federal
81
circuit courts. The Board first reviewed the Ninth Circuit’s holding
in Lin and concluded that its reasoning was unpersuasive because
“[w]hen the departure bar rule is examined in context, we believe it
70

Id.
Id. at 159–60.
72
8 C.F.R. § 6.12 (1952).
73
In re G-y-B, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 160.
74
24 I. & N. Dec. 646, 660 (B.I.A. 2008).
75
Id. at 646, 647.
76
See id. at 646.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
473 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that so long as 8 C.F.R. §
1003.23(b)(1) is explicitly phrased in the present tense, an IJ has jurisdiction to consider a motion to reopen filed by a removed alien).
80
In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 646.
81
Id. at 647–60.
71
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clearly applies to removed aliens.” The Board then detailed its disa83
greement with the Fourth Circuit’s holding in William v. Gonzales.
In the Board’s view, the Act, when taken as a whole, draws a distinction between aliens who have departed after being ordered removed
84
and those who have remained in the United States. Ultimately, the
Board explained that it was bound by the Fourth Circuit’s precedent
to apply the William holding to BIA cases involving post-departure bar
issues; however, the Board explicitly noted that such rulings would be
85
limited exclusively to the Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction. The Board
86
further explained, albeit in dicta, that “the departure bar regulation
deprives the BIA of jurisdiction to consider statutory motions to reo87
pen after the movant’s departure from the United States.” The BIA
concluded that, in other jurisdictions, it will continue to uphold the
88
validity of the regulatory departure bars.
C. In re Bulnes-Nolasco
In 2009, the BIA restricted the scope of the departure-bar rule in
In re Bulnes-Nolasco with regard to a motion to reopen to rescind an
89
order. The court held the departure bar inapplicable to aliens who
have departed the country while under an outstanding order of de90
portation or removal issued in absentia. Respondent, a native and

82

Id. at 651.
Id. at 654–60; William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 330 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding
that the INA’s statutory language always invalidates regulatory departure bars). For a
discussion of William see, infra Part V.A.
84
In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 655 (“[The William court] observed
that [8 U.S.C. §] 240(c)(7) of the Act does not expressly distinguish between aliens
who have departed the United States after being ordered removed and those who
have remained.”). The Board also disagreed with the majority in William because it
did not find that the physical presence requirement under 8 U.S.C. §
240(c)(7)(C)(v)(IV) implicitly invalidated the departure bar. Id. at 658; see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(v)(IV) (2006) (imposing a physical presence requirement in the
United States for domestic violence victims for filing motions to reopen or reconsider).
85
In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 660.
86
Petitioner Armendarez-Mendez violated the regulatory filing deadline by submitting the motion at issue nearly fifteen months late. Id. at 647. Therefore, reaching the issue of whether the departure bar was valid was not necessary to the court’s
conclusion. See id.
87
Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 100 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing In re Armendarez-Mendez,
24 I & N. Dec. at 653–60).
88
In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 660.
89
25 I. & N. Dec. 57, 60 (B.I.A. 2009).
90
Id.
83
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citizen of Honduras, entered the United States without inspection on
91
July 28, 1996. Then, in August 1996, the DHS served respondent
92
with an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing. Respondent,
however, did not appear for her deportation hearing two years later,
93
at which point the IJ ordered her deported in absentia. Nine years
later, on December 7, 2007, respondent filed a motion to reopen on
the ground that she did not receive proper notice of the deportation
94
hearing. Upholding the application of the departure bar, the IJ de95
nied respondent’s motion on January 17, 2008.
The Board read 8 U.S.C. § 1l01(g) as presupposing the existence
of an outstanding order for deportation as the basis on which an
alien’s “self-deportation” may deprive the court of jurisdiction to con96
sider the alien’s motion to reopen or reconsider. Examining the
97
specific language used in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(2), the
Board focused on the usage of the term “rescinded” and noted that
98
the term “rescind” means “to annul ab initio” when dealing with an
99
in absentia deportation order. The Board then ruled that “[a]n in
absentia deportation order issued in proceedings of which the respondent had no notice is voidable from its inception and becomes a
legal nullity upon its rescission, with the result that the respondent
reverts to the same immigration status that he . . . possessed prior to
100
entry of the order.”
Ultimately, the Board concluded, as did the
91

Id. at 57.
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
In re Bulnes-Nolasco, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 58. Respondent then filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the IJ denied that motion as well. Id.
96
Id. at 59.
97
Regarding exceptions to filing deadlines, the regulation provides in relevant
part:
(A) An order entered in absentia in deportation proceedings may be
rescinded only upon a motion to reopen filed:
....
(2) At any time if the alien demonstrates that he or she did not receive
notice or if the alien demonstrates that he or she was in federal or state
custody and the failure to appear was through no fault of the alien.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(2) (2011).
98
See In re M-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 349, 353 (B.I.A. 1998) (citing BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1306 (6th ed. 1990) (“‘[R]escission’ means to annul ab initio.”)). “Ab
initio” is a Latin term meaning “[f]rom the beginning.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 4
(7th ed. 1999).
99
In re Bulnes-Nolasco, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 59.
100
Id.
92
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Eleventh Circuit in Contreras-Rodriguez v. United States Attorney Gener101
al, “that an in absentia deportation order does not so qualify if it
was issued in a proceeding of which the alien did not properly receive
102
notice.”
The above-referenced cases illustrate the lack of predictability
103
and uniformity in the BIA’s decisions. Despite having a long history
of upholding the regulatory departure bars, the BIA has recently begun modifying its jurisprudence in this area of the law. As noted, the
BIA deviated slightly from its longstanding practice of upholding the
regulatory departure bar in In re Bulnes-Nolasco, which may suggest
that the BIA is willing to assess the validity of departure bars separate104
ly in different contexts.
V. DEPARTURE BAR JURISPRUDENCE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
A. The Fourth Circuit’s William v. Gonzales
Tunbosun Olawale William (“William”), a native and citizen of
Nigeria, became a legal permanent resident of the United States in
105
1996. One year later, a Maryland court sentenced William to prison
and probation after he pled guilty to receipt of a stolen credit card in
106
violation of Maryland law. Then, in November 1997, “the Immigration and Naturalization Service (‘INS’) charged William with being
removable as an aggravated felon for committing an offense involving
fraud or deceit,” and subsequently “charged William with being re107
movable as having committed a crime of moral turpitude.”
Ultimately, an IJ found William removable based on his conviction of a
101

462 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2006). See In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec.
646, 654 n.6 (B.I.A. 2008) (reserving decision on this issue).
102
In re Bulnes-Nolasco, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 59. Finally, the Board remanded the
matter to the IJ to allow him to decide whether the respondent’s in absentia deportation order was subject to rescission for lack of proper notice. Id. at 60.
103
See David Isaacson, Filing and Adjudication of Motions to Reopen and Reconsider After Departure from the United States, CYRUS D. MEHTA & ASSOCS., PLLC IMMIG. & NAT’LITY
L.
(Sept.
13,
2010),
http://www.cyrusmehta.com/
News.aspx?SubIdx=ocyrus201091310474&Month=&From=Menu&Page=19&Year=All
(“Recent caselaw . . . indicates that this rule is not as uniform as many had previously
supposed.”).
104
In re Bulnes-Nolasco, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 60; see infra Part IV.C.
105
William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 331 (4th Cir. 2007).
106
Id. The court sentenced William “to eighteen months imprisonment, with
nine months suspended and three years probation.” Id.
107
Id.; see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(M), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)
(2006).
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crime of moral turpitude and ineligible for relief.
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and William did not seek further review in
109
the Fourth Circuit.
Government officials then removed William
110
from the United States in July 2005.
Shortly after removal, William filed a petition for a writ of coram
111
112
nobis in state court seeking to vacate his Maryland conviction. In
October 2005, the state court granted William’s writ and vacated his
113
conviction.
Then, in December 2005, “William filed a motion to
reopen immigration proceedings before the BIA” based on the ex114
ceptional circumstances of his case. The BIA denied his motion by
holding that the departure bar under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) stripped
the court of jurisdiction to consider William’s motion because he had
115
already been removed from the country. At this point, William petitioned the Fourth Circuit for review of the BIA’s application of the
116
departure bar.
William primarily argued that “the post-departure
bar on motions to reopen[] is invalid because it conflicts with clear
117
statutory language.” The government, however, argued that the statute is “silent with respect to post-departure motions to reopen in that it
does not specifically address them,” and therefore the Attorney Gen118
eral’s regulations appropriately fill the gap.
119
Judge Shedd, writing for the majority, used the Chevron analysis
120
to determine the validity of the Agency’s regulation.
Beginning
108

William, 499 F.3d at 331.
Id. William did, however, file a motion to reconsider with the BIA whereby he
argued “that he had received limited post-conviction relief in the form of a reduction
of sentence.” Id. The BIA denied this motion and, once again, William did not pursue further review in the Fourth Circuit. Id.
110
Id.
111
See United States v. Denedo, 129 S. Ct. 2213, 2220 (2009) (“The writ of coram
nobis is an ancient common-law remedy designed to correct errors of fact.”).
112
William, 499 F.3d at 331.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 331. William argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) grants the right to
reopen without regard to an alien’s physical presence in the country. See id. at 332.
This, he argued, conflicted with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d), which limits the right based on
the alien’s physical presence in the country. See id. at 331–32.
118
William, 499 F.3d at 332.
119
Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under the
Chevron doctrine, a court must first consider “whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue.” Id. at 842. If so, the inquiry ends because both the
court and the agency “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
109
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with the statutory provision, the court noted that 8 U.S.C. §
1229a(c)(7)(A) provides that “‘[a]n alien may file one motion to
121
reopen proceedings under this section.’”
Given its precise language, which explicitly provides for a temporal limitation but also
specifically removes the prior codified geographical limitation, the
court found that “§ 1229a(c)(7)(A) unambiguously provides an alien
with the right to file one motion to reopen, regardless of whether he
122
is within or without the country.”
Thus, the Fourth Circuit foreclosed the government’s argument that the statute “is silent with re123
spect to post-departure motions to reopen.”
Additionally, the court found that the “clarity and breadth of the
statutory language likewise overc[a]me the Government’s argument
that . . . Congress codified the right to file a motion to reopen while
leaving the regulatory post-departure bar in place by not expressly
124
repealing it.”
According to the court, Congress clearly addressed
and “at least implicitly repealed” the departure bar when it decided
to grant “an alien” the right to move to reopen without further speci125
fying a physical presence requirement. Moreover, the court noted
that the government’s argument also lacked contextual support because “one of IIRIRA’s aims is to expedite the removal of aliens from
the country while permitting them to continue to seek review of their
126
removal orders from abroad.”
The majority found that the overall structure of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a
127
reinforced its interpretation of § 1229a(c)(7)(A) in two ways. First,
Congress’s specific limitations on the right to file a motion to reopen
supports the conclusion that § 1229a(c)(7)(A) cannot be read to ex128
clude aliens who have departed the country.
Second, for motions
Congress.” Id. at 842–43. On the other hand, if Congress has not addressed the
question at issue, the court must determine “whether the agency’s answer is based on
a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843.
120
William, 499 F.3d at 331.
121
Id. at 332 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)(2006)). For the text of the current departure bar see, infra Part VII.
122
William, 499 F.3d at 332.
123
Id.
124
Id. at n.2.
125
Id.
126
Id. at n.3.
127
Id. at 333.
128
William, 499 F.3d at 333; see United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58 (2000)
(“When Congress provides exceptions in a statute, it does not follow that courts have
authority to create others. The proper inference . . . is that Congress considered the
issue of exceptions and, in the end, limited the statute to the ones set forth.”).
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to reopen for victims of domestic violence under §
129
1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(IV), Congress expressly included a physical
130
presence requirement.
Thus, the court drew a negative inference
that, by not requiring physical presence in the statutory language of §
1229a(c)(7)(A), Congress did not intend to limit such motions to
131
reopen to aliens who have not departed the country. Further, the
court also noted that if Congress had intended the departure bar to
apply to all motions, the express language requiring physical pres132
ence for victims of domestic violence would be superfluous.
The majority concluded that congressional intent was unequivocal: “§ 1229a(c)(7)(A) clearly and unambiguously grants an alien
the right to file one motion to reopen, regardless of whether he is
133
present in the United States when the motion is filed.” Therefore,
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) is in direct conflict with the clear language of the
statute; the INA thereby removes any authority from the regulation
134
and renders it invalid.
135
Chief Judge Williams dissented.
The Chief Judge’s primary
disagreements with the majority’s analysis were that Congress’s statutory language did not repeal the regulatory departure bar and that
the majority never engaged in the second step of the Chevron analy-

129

The Act states in pertinent part:
(iv) Special rule for battered spouses, children, and parents. Any limitation under this section on the deadlines for filing such motions shall
not apply.
....
(IV) if the alien is physically present in the United States at the time of
filing the motion.
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(IV) (2006).
130
See William, 499 F.3d at 333.
131
Id.; see Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 528 (2003) (“[Where] Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section
of the same Act . . . it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
132
See William, 499 F.3d at 333; see, e.g., TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31
(2001) (“It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon
the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or
word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.”).
133
William, 499 F.3d at 333; see In re Coleman, 426 F.3d 719, 725 (4th Cir. 2005)
(“If the language is plain and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, we
need not inquire further.”).
134
William, 499 F.3d at 334; see Allen v. United States, 173 F.3d 533, 536 (4th Cir.
1999) (“[W]e must overturn a regulation that clearly conflicts with the plain text of
the statute.”).
135
William, 499 F.3d at 334 (Williams, C.J., dissenting).
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136

sis. Unlike the majority, the dissent could not get a “‘clear sense of
congressional intent’ to repeal the departure bar simply because the
numerical limitation on motions to reopen now occupies a place in
the United States Code where previously it only existed in the Federal
137
Register.” Chief Judge Williams further noted that, when viewed in
its entirety, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) makes clear that the statute is
nothing more than a numerical limitation on an alien’s ability to file
138
a motion to reopen immigration proceedings.
Moreover, the dissent pointed out that Congress did not add the domestic violence exception’s physical presence requirement to § 1229a until 2000—
139
nearly a decade after IIRIRA’s enactment.
Under Chief Judge Williams’s own analysis of Chevron’s first step,
he concluded that the statute is silent, and the agency is empowered
140
by statute to issue regulations to dispel the silence. The Judge then
141
Chief Judge Williams conproceeded to Chevron’s second step.
cluded that the Attorney General’s reasoning that the goal of achieving finality in immigration matters outweighs the burdens associated
with adjudicating motions to reopen filed on behalf of departed or
removed aliens is reasonable enough to defer to the Attorney Gener142
al and thus uphold the regulation.

136

See id.
Id. at 335 (quoting Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600
(2004)).
138
See id. at 336; see United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984) (“We do not
. . . construe statutory phrases in isolation; we read statutes as a whole.”).
139
William, 499 F.3d at 337 (Williams, C.J., dissenting); see Victims of Trafficking
and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464. According
to Chief Judge Williams, this Act sought to “snuff out sex slave trade and domestic
violence,” which is “connected neither in time nor purpose” to the IIRIRA amendments regarding motions to reopen. William, 499 F.3d at 337 (Williams, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Williams countered the “negative inference” argument by stating
that “Congress is presumed to have known about and approved of the departure bar
when it amended the INA without explicitly repealing it.” Id. at 338–41.
140
See William, 499 F.3d at 342 (Williams, C.J., dissenting).
141
Chevron’s second step requires the court to determine whether the regulation
is “reasonable in light of the legislature’s revealed design” in order to uphold the
agency’s interpretation. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
142
See id. at 345; Nat’l Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 146 (1920) (explaining that deference to an agency’s construction of a statute is “especially [appropriate] where such construction has been long continued”).
137
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B. The Tenth Circuit’s Mendiola v. Holder
Prior to the release of the Mendiola decision, but after briefing,
143
the Tenth Circuit decided Rosillo-Puga v. Holder.
Finding the case
analogous to Mendiola’s, the Mendiola court relied heavily on the
144
precedential effect of Rosillo-Puga.
1.

Rosillo-Puga v. Holder
145

In 2003, an IJ ordered Rosillo-Puga removed to Mexico. Three
years later he filed a motion to reopen his proceedings with the IJ on
the ground that the court could exercise sua sponte jurisdiction un146
147
der 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) to consider his motion.
The IJ denied Rosillo-Puga’s motion, and the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision,
finding that § 1003.23(b)(1) deprived the IJ of jurisdiction to hear
Rosillo-Puga’s motion to reopen proceedings because he had already
148
departed the country.
Rosillo-Puga relied upon William v. Gonzales in making his argument that 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) permits “an alien” to file one
motion to reopen regardless of whether that alien is inside or outside
149
the United States. The Rosillo-Puga court, however, disagreed with
the majority’s opinion in William and instead reached the same con150
clusion that was articulated in Chief Judge Williams’s dissent.
As
the court did in William, the Rosillo-Puga court applied the two-step
Chevron test to review the Agency’s construction of the statute at is151
First, the court analyzed Congress’s statutory language and
sue.
found that it was “simply silent on the issue of whether it meant to
repeal the post-departure bars contained in the Attorney General’s

143

580 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2009) (dealing with regulatory motions to reopen
under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.23(b)(1), 1003.2(d)), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 502 (2010).
144
See Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303, 1304–05 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 502 (2010).
145
Id. at 1306 (citing Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1149). This Part of the Comment
focuses mainly on the Mendiola court’s iteration of the facts and holding of RosilloPuga. It is the author’s position that the precedential effect of Rosillo-Puga is better
understood through the Mendiola court’s iteration of Rosillo-Puga’s facts and holding.
146
8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (2011) (“An Immigration Judge may upon his or her
own motion at any time . . . reopen or reconsider any case . . . .”).
147
Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1306–07 (citing Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1150).
148
Id. at 1307.
149
See id.; see also William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 332 (4th Cir. 2007). For a
discussion of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (2006), see infra Part VII.
150
Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1307.
151
Id. at 1307–08; see William, 499 F.3d at 331–32.
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regulations.”
The court then inquired into “whether the agency’s
interpretation is ‘based on a permissible construction of the sta153
tute.’” Finding it “inconceivable” for Congress to have repealed the
regulatory post-departure bar without stating anything about its fortyyear history in practice, the court upheld the post-departure bar as a
valid regulation under the “Attorney General’s Congressionallydelegated rulemaking authority, and [therefore ruled that the bar]
154
does not contravene 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) or (7)(C).”
The Rosillo-Puga court ultimately upheld the BIA’s holdings that
it lacked jurisdiction to hear Rosillo-Puga’s motion to reopen under 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) and that the BIA and IJ lacked sua sponte jurisdic155
156
tion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) to consider the motion to reopen.
The ruling, however, was not unanimous; Judge Lucero filed a lone
157
dissent.
Judge Lucero reasoned that a plain reading of 8 U.S.C. §
1229a(c)(6)(A) and (7)(A) “unambiguously guarantee[s] every alien
the right to file . . . one motion to reopen removal proceedings, re158
gardless of whether the alien has departed from the United States.”
According to the dissent, Congress’s use of inclusive language in the
152

Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1307–08 (quoting Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1147,
1157 (10th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
153
Id. at 1308 (quoting Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1157).
154
See id. (quoting Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1156) (internal quotation marks omitted).
155
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2011) (“The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider
on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.”); see 8 C.F.R. §
1003.23(b)(1) (2011) (“An [IJ] may upon his or her own motion at any time . . .
reopen or reconsider any case in which he or she has made a decision . . . .”).
156
Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1308; see also Navarro-Miranda v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 672,
675–76 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding the interpretation by the BIA that the departure bar
removes its jurisdiction, including its sua sponte authority, to reopen the removal
proceedings of a deported alien to be reasonable and upholding the same).
157
See Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1161–71 (Lucero, J., dissenting); see also Mendiola,
585 F.3d at 1308 n.5. For purposes of developing Judge Lucero’s arguments in his
dissenting opinion in greater detail from that which is found in the Mendiola opinion, this Comment will provide some additional information by analyzing text taken
directly from Judge Lucero’s dissenting opinion in Rosillo-Puga.
158
Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1162 (Lucero, J., dissenting). Under a different approach, Judge Lucero noted that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Dada v.
Mukasey “‘supports the conclusion that the post-departure bar is inconsistent with’
the statute because it ‘held all aliens have a statutory right to file one motion to reopen’ pursuant to § 1229a(c)(7).” Mindeola, 585 F.3d at 1308 n.5 (quoting RosilloPuga, 580 F.3d at 1168 (Lucero, J., dissenting)); see Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 22
(2008) (stating that a “more expeditious solution” to the problem would be to permit aliens to file motions to reopen after they have left the country) (decided on
other grounds).
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terms “the alien” and “an alien” indicated Congress’s intent not to
exclude a subclass of aliens—those who have departed and are thus
159
outside the INA’s scope.
Judge Lucero also found, as did the majority in William, that the textual contrast between the domestic violence section of the statute, which explicitly imposes a physical presence requirement, and other sections of the statute that do not, illuillustrates Congress’s intent not to place geographical limitations on
160
all motions to reopen or reconsider.
Such a reading, the dissent
noted, would render the physical presence requirement under the
161
domestic violence section “mere surplusage.”
2.

Mendiola v. Holder

Eddie Mendiola, a native and citizen of Peru, became a lawful
162
permanent resident of the United States in April 1989. In July 1996
and August 2000, a California state court convicted Mendiola of pos163
session of steroids.
Subsequently, an Idaho state court convicted
164
Mendiola of being an accessory to a felony in September 2003.
Thereafter, DHS officials detained and transported Mendiola to an
165
immigration detention facility in Colorado.
The DHS then commenced removal proceedings against Mendiola on grounds that he
166
was an alien convicted of an aggravated felony.
Mendiola moved for a change of venue from the Tenth Circuit
to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that his underlying conviction occurred
in California and thus his case should fall within the Ninth Circuit’s
167
jurisdiction.
The IJ denied a change of venue, applied Tenth Circuit law, found that Mendiola was removable based upon his aggra168
The
vated felony conviction, and ordered him removed to Peru.
159

Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1164 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1165; see also William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 333 (4th Cir. 2007).
161
Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1165 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (quoting William, 499
F.3d at 333).
162
Mendiola v. Gonzales, 189 F. App’x 810, 812 (10th Cir. 2006).
163
Id.; see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11377(a) (West 2010). On July 30, 1996,
a California state court convicted Mendiola of misdemeanor possession in violation
of a state law. Mendiola, 189 F. App’x at 812. Then, on August 7, 2000, the court
convicted him of felony possession. Id.
164
Mendiola, 189 F. App’x at 812.
165
Id.
166
Id.; see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B) (2006) (defining aggravated felony to include a “drug-trafficking crime”); id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (pertaining to removability).
167
Mendiola, 189 F. App’x at 812.
168
Id.
160
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169

BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed Mendiola’s appeal.
The BIA noted that the IJ properly applied Tenth Circuit law because
“there [wa]s no reason to believe that the Tenth Circuit would apply
Ninth Circuit law to determine [Mendiola’s] removability simply because [his] criminal conviction occurred within the territorial juris170
diction of the Ninth Circuit.”
171
Mendiola then petitioned the Tenth Circuit for review. While
his petition was pending, government officials removed Mendiola to
172
173
Peru in March 2005. The court then denied Mendiola’s petition.
174
Within two years, Mendiola returned to the United States illegally.
In 2007, Mendiola filed his first motion to reopen with the BIA while
175
he was in federal custody for his illegal return. The BIA denied his
motion on two grounds: (1) 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) stripped the BIA of
jurisdiction to consider the motion, and (2) Mendiola’s motion was
untimely because it was filed nearly three years after the expiration of
176
the ninety-day limit imposed by § 1003.2(c)(2).
Mendiola filed
177
178
another petition in 2007. The BIA similarly denied this petition.
In 2008, Mendiola obtained new counsel and filed a second motion to reopen his proceedings on grounds that his former attorney’s
ineffectiveness and the California court’s reduction of his second
conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor in 2007 rendered it ap-

169

Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Castro-Rocha, 323 F.3d 846 (10th Cir. 2003) (applying Tenth Circuit law when deciding if conviction in a state outside Tenth Circuit’s
jurisdiction constituted aggravated felony); Tapia-Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216 (10th
Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Cabrera-Sosa, 81 F.3d 998 (10th Cir. 1996)
(same)).
171
Id. at 811.
172
Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303, 1305 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 502 (2010).
173
Mendiola, 189 F. App’x at 815.
174
Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1305. Shortly after Mendiola returned illegally to the
United States, federal agents detained him on a charge of reentry after removal for
an aggravated felony. Id. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006).
175
Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1305.
176
Id.; see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2011) (“[A] party may file only one motion to
reopen . . . proceedings (whether before the Board or the Immigration Judge) and
that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered . . .”). Mendiola’s final administrative order of
removal was issued in 2004. Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1305.
177
Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1305.
178
Id. Mendiola failed to argue in his briefs that § 1003.2(d) did not apply to his
case. Mendiola v. Mukasey, 280 F. App’x 719, 722 (10th Cir. 2008).
170
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179

propriate.
The BIA denied Mendiola’s second motion to reopen,
holding again that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the matter under
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) and that it also lacked authority to reopen the
180
matter sua sponte under § 1003.2(a).
In addition, the BIA found
that Mendiola’s motion was deniable due to its untimeliness and to
the numerical limitation placed on motions to reopen under §
181
1003.2(c)(2). Undeterred, Mendiola once again filed a petition for
182
review with the Tenth Circuit, which the court ultimately granted.
Circuit Judge Baldock, writing for the majority, began the
court’s analysis with a look at the history of the post-departure bar in
183
the United States and the IIRIRA’s enactment in 1996. The court
noted that “for fifty years the BIA has consistently followed this ‘jurisdictional principle,’ holding ‘that reopening is unavailable to any
184
alien who departs the United States after being ordered removed.’”
After discussing the pertinent facts and holding of Rosillo-Puga, the
court focused its attention on Mendiola’s primary arguments. Mendiola argued that the BIA erred when it held that 8 C.F.R. §
185
1003.2(d) deprived it of jurisdiction to hear his motion to reopen.
He also argued that “Rosillo-Puga did not extend the post-departure
bar’s application to motions to reopen filed by aliens pursuant to 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) where the motion alleges ineffective assistance of
186
counsel rising to the level of a due process violation.”
The court relied on Rosillo-Puga’s precedential effect to counter
187
First, the court, in accordance with stare decisis
both arguments.
principles, upheld the Rosillo-Puga court’s conclusion that §
188
1003.2(d) was valid. Second, finding that the language of 8 C.F.R. §
1003.2(c) “mirrors” the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7), which

179

Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1305.
Id.; see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2011) (“The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.”).
181
Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1305–06; see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2011); see also 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2006) (containing similar language involving a ninety-day limit).
182
Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1306.
183
Id.
184
Id. (quoting In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 646, 648 (B.I.A. 2008)).
185
Id. at 1304.
186
Id. at 1309; see § 1003.2(c)(2) (2011).
187
Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1310.
188
Id.; see Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1147, 1156 (2009).
180
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the Rosillo-Puga court addressed, the Mendiola court applied the same
189
analysis to the present matter.
The court then iterated the Rosillo-Puga court’s conclusion that
“Congress’s provision for one motion to reopen within 90 days of removal in those statutory subsections does not alter the valid continued operation of the regulatory post-departure bar to motions to
190
reopen.” The court then noted that the departure bar divested the
BIA and IJ of jurisdiction in Rosillo-Puga under a similar regulatory
departure bar and also specified that the court is “bound by the
191
precedent.” Thus, the court held that the departure bar applied to
192
Mendiola.
C. Additional Applications of the Departure Bar in the Federal Circuits
As the case summaries above have shown, case law “indicates
193
[that] this rule is not as uniform as many had previously supposed.”
“[A] substantial number of Court of Appeals and BIA cases have
opened up the possibility that certain aliens may be able to file or
pursue motions to reopen and reconsider even after departing from
194
the United States.” To illustrate the disparities in departure bar jurisprudence in different areas of the country, this Comment will now
consider a sample of pertinent circuit cases.
1.

The First Circuit Upholds Regulatory Departure Bar’s
Validity

In Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, the First Circuit held that the departure bar in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) was a valid jurisdictional limitation on an IJ’s authority to consider a departed alien’s motion to
195
reopen or reconsider proceedings.
The First Circuit’s jurisdiction
includes Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Puerto Rico, and
196
Rhode Island. Therefore, a departed alien whose removal proceed189

Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1309–10.
Id. (citing Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1156).
191
Id. at 1310.
192
Id.
193
Isaacson, supra note 103.
194
Id.
195
489 F.3d 438, 443 (1st Cir. 2007) (en banc); see also Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d
650, 654 n.2 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that the Pena court rejected “the argument that
the departure bar was impliedly repealed by the [IIRIRA]”); William v. Gonzales, 499
F.3d 329, 345 n.6 (4th Cir. 2007) (Williams, C.J., dissenting).
196
See Court Locator, U.S. CRTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/court_locator.aspx (last
visited Jan. 5, 2012).
190
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ings have taken place or are taking place within the First Circuit’s jurisdiction will be barred from filing a motion to reopen the proceedings.
2.

The Second Circuit Holds that the BIA Cannot
Constrict Its Congressionally-Given Jurisdiction

In Zhang v. Holder, the Second Circuit upheld as reasonable the
BIA’s decision to bar the petitioner’s motion to reopen removal proceedings seeking the court’s sua sponte authority under 8 C.F.R. §
1003.2(a) because of the particular historical evolution of the regula197
tion and because the alien had departed the country. More specifically, the court upheld as “not plainly erroneous” the BIA’s interpretation that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) deprives the Board of jurisdiction to
198
hear petitioner’s motion to reopen sua sponte.
In 2011, however,
the Second Circuit revisited the departure bar issue and reached a
199
different result in Luna v. Holder. While following an approach sim200
201
ilar to the Sixth and Seventh Circuits’, the court in Luna held that
the “BIA may not contract the jurisdiction that Congress gave it by
applying the departure bar regulation [under] 8 C.F.R. §
202
1003.2(d) . . . to statutory motions to reopen.”
According to the
court, Congress did not make jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1229a(c)(7) dependent upon whether an alien is present within the
203
United States. Rather, the IIRIRA repealed the statutory bar to de204
parted aliens that had already been in place. Ultimately, the court
held that “the BIA must exercise its full jurisdiction to adjudicate a
statutory motion to reopen by an alien who is removed or otherwise
205
departs the United States before or after filing the motion.” Thus,
a departed alien who was subject to or is subject to removal proceed-

197

Zhang, 617 F.3d at 661.
Id. at 652.
199
637 F.3d 85, 100 (2d Cir. 2011).
200
See discussion infra Part V.C.6.
201
See discussion infra Part V.C.7.
202
Luna, 637 F.3d at 100.
203
Id. at 101.
204
Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (repealed 1996).
205
Luna, 637 F.3d at 102. The court declined, however, to determine the validity
of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) in every possible context. Id. Thus, it is not clear how the
court will rule on an issue regarding the regulatory sua sponte motion to reopen.
198
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ings in Connecticut, New York, or Vermont is not barred from filing a
206
statutory motion to reopen.
3.

The Third Circuit Holds Post-Departure Bar Conflicts
with Clear Congressional Intent

In an unpublished opinion in 2009, the Third Circuit upheld
the validity of the departure bar contained in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d),
207
pertaining to motions to reopen or reconsider before the BIA. In
2010, the Third Circuit held the BIA’s interpretation of the regulato208
ry departure bar in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(e) to be incorrect because the
Board equated the word “departure” with “deportation” and/or “re209
In its decision, the court noted that although an alien
mov[al].”
who voluntarily departs during deportation proceedings may be
deemed to have waived his or her right to appeal, “it is less equitable
210
to so deem an alien who was involuntarily removed . . . .”
More recently, the Third Circuit unequivocally held that “the
post-departure bar regulation [under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d)] conflicts
211
with Congress’[s] clear intent for several reasons.”
Those reasons
included, among others, that the “plain text of the statute provides
each ‘alien’ with the right to file one motion to reopen”; that Congress incorporated geographical limitations in a subsequent addition
to the IIRIRA but did not add a geographical limitation to the overall
statute generally; and that “Congress specifically withdrew the statutory post-departure bar to judicial review in conformity with IIRIRA’s
212
purpose of speeding departure, but improving accuracy.”
The
Third Circuit’s jurisdiction includes Delaware, New Jersey, and Penn213
sylvania. Therefore, aliens whose judicial proceedings took place in
206

The Second Circuit’s jurisdiction comprises these states. See Court Locator, supra note 196.
207
Tahiraj-Dauti v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 323 F. App’x 138, 139 (3d Cir. 2009); see infra
text accompanying note 266.
208
8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(e) (2011) (“Departure from the United States of a person
who is the subject of deportation proceedings, prior to the taking of an appeal from
a decision in his or her case, shall constitute a waiver of his or her right to appeal.”).
209
Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 394 F. App’x 941, 944–55 (3d Cir. 2010).
210
Id. at 945 (emphasis added); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(e) (2011) (pertaining to
waivers of appeal).
211
Espinal v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 653 F.3d 213, 224 (3d Cir. 2011). Although this case
dealt specifically with the motion-to-reconsider portion of the regulation, the court
noted that the analysis for the motion to reopen is the same and thus if one portion
is invalid, the other is as well. Id. at 217 n.3.
212
Id. at 224.
213
See Court Locator, supra note 196.
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these states will not be jurisdictionally barred solely because they have
filed motions to reopen after departing the United States.
4.

The Fourth Circuit Holds that Regulatory Departure
Bars Are Always Invalid
214

As noted in greater detail above, the Fourth Circuit holds that
the departure bar contained in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) clearly conflicts
with the statutory language in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) and there215
fore is rendered invalid. Thus, an alien who faces removal proceedings in Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, or West
Virginia is not jurisdictionally barred from filing a motion to reopen
216
or reconsider solely because the alien has departed the country.
5.

The Fifth Circuit Upholds Regulatory Departure Bar’s
Validity

In 2003, the Fifth Circuit in Ovalles v. Holder ruled that the BIA’s
decision—that the departure bar in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) deprived the
BIA of the jurisdiction to sua sponte consider a motion to reopen
filed by an alien who has departed the country following termination
217
of removal proceedings—was proper.
More recently, the court directly ruled on the regulatory departure bar’s validity in Toora v.
218
Holder. In Toora, the court held that the departure bar contained in
8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) “applied to an alien who departed the U.S.
after receiving notice of his deportation proceeding, but before the
proceeding was completed and the [IJ] entered a deportation or219
der.”
Thus, individuals whose removal proceedings have already

214

See supra Part V.A.
William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 331 (4th Cir. 2007).
216
The Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction comprises these states. See Court Locator, supra
note 196.
217
577 F.3d 288, 299–300 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding no need to squarely address the
validity of § 1003.2(d) because the motion to reopen was untimely); see NavarroMiranda v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 2003) (upholding 8 C.F.R. §
3.2(d)—the predecessor to § 1003.2(d)—as a valid restriction on the BIA’s jurisdiction to hear an alien’s motion to reopen once that alien has departed the United
States). See generally Emma Rebhorn, Note, Ovalles v. Holder: Better Late than . . . on
Time? The Fifth Circuit Avoids Ruling on the Validity of the Postdeparture Bar, 84 TUL. L.
REV. 1347 (discussing how the Fifth Circuit avoided directly addressing the validity of
the departure bar at issue).
218
603 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2010).
219
Toora v. Holder, No. 09-60073, FINDLAW (Apr. 9, 2010, 12:03 PM),
http://blogs.findlaw.com/fifth_circuit/2010/04/toora-v-holder-no-09-60073.html
(discussing Toora, 603 F.3d at 288).
215
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been terminated and individuals who are presently subject to removal
proceedings in Louisiana, Mississippi, or Texas, and have departed
the United States either after completion of their removal proceedings or prior to an official removal order, will be barred from moving
220
to reopen or reconsider their proceedings.
6.

The Sixth Circuit Holds that the BIA Cannot Constrict
Its Jurisdiction to Hear Statutorily Created Motions to
Reopen

In 2007, the Sixth Circuit simply noted in a footnote in Ablahad
v. Gonzales that petitioner’s “motions to reopen were also barred by 8
221
C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(d) and 1003.23(b)(1).” Two years later, however,
the court addressed the particular matter at issue in Madrigal v. Holder
with finality when it held that the departure bar rule under 8 C.F.R. §
222
1003.4 does not apply to aliens who have been involuntarily re223
moved from the United States. In 2011, the Sixth Circuit resolved
all of the outstanding issues concerning the departure bar’s application in Pruidze v. Holder, where the court held that the BIA cannot
curtail its own jurisdiction to entertain a departed alien’s motion to
224
reopen.
First, the court explicitly stated that “no statute gives the
[BIA] purchase for disclaiming jurisdiction to entertain a motion to
225
reopen filed by aliens who have left the country.” Second, the court
explained that a line of recent Supreme Court decisions makes clear
that the BIA’s authority is to interpret the regulation as a mandatory
226
legal rule and not as jurisdictional. Absent a statute providing the
BIA with such authority, “the agency may not disclaim jurisdiction to

220
The Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction comprises these states. See Court Locator, supra
note 196.
221
217 F. App’x 470, 475 n.6 (6th Cir. 2007).
222
8 C.F.R. § 1003.4 (2011) (pertaining to withdrawal of appeal).
223
572 F.3d 239, 243–45 (6th Cir. 2009); see Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d
591, 594 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that the Sixth Circuit is one of two circuits that hold
departure bars inapplicable to involuntarily removed aliens). Involuntary removal
entails a government-induced removal. See Coyt v. Holder, 595 F.3d 902, 907 (9th
Cir. 2010) (“[T]he physical removal of a petitioner by the United States does not
preclude the petitioner from pursuing a motion to reopen.”).
224
632 F.3d 234, 237–38 (6th Cir. 2011).
225
Id. at 237.
226
Id. at 238 (citing Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 130 S. Ct. 584 (2009); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006); Kontrick v.
Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004); Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998)).
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227

handle a motion to reopen that Congress empowered it to resolve.”
Thus, the BIA erred when it held that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) deprived it
228
of jurisdiction to entertain Pruidze’s motion.
It follows that an
alien whose removal proceedings took place in Kentucky, Michigan,
Ohio, or Tennessee and has since departed the country voluntarily or
229
involuntarily may file a motion to reopen his or her proceedings.
7.

The Seventh Circuit Holds that the BIA Cannot
Constrict Its Jurisdiction

The Seventh Circuit’s approach is similar to the Sixth Circuit’s.
In Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, the Seventh Circuit struck down the departure bar under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) as invalid because an agency
is not entitled to “contract its own jurisdiction by regulations or by
230
decisions in litigated proceedings.”
Thus, “until the BIA rethinks
the theoretical basis for the departure bar . . . motions to reopen . . .
231
will survive an alien’s departure in the Seventh Circuit as well.” It
follows that aliens who are or were subjected to removal proceedings
in Illinois, Indiana, or Wisconsin, have since departed the country,
and wish to move to reopen their removal proceedings are not jurisdictionally barred simply due to the regulatory departure bar’s physi232
cal presence requirement.
8.

The Ninth Circuit Holds the Regulatory Departure Bar
Inapplicable to Involuntarily Removed Aliens
233

In 2007, the Lin v. Gonzales court relied “on the rule of lenity
to hold that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) does not deprive an IJ of jurisdiction to consider a motion to reopen filed by a removed alien” so
234
long as the regulation is explicitly phrased in the present tense.

227

Id. at 239.
Id. at 241.
229
The Sixth Circuit’s jurisdiction comprises these states. See Court Locator, supra
note 196.
230
612 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 2010) (“We think that Union Pacific is dispositive in
favor of the holding in William—though on a rationale distinct from the [F]ourth
[C]ircuit’s.”); Union Pac. R.R., 130 S. Ct. 584; see also ROSENBLOOM ET AL., supra note
3, at 6–7 (noting that the court in Marin-Rodriguez held that the regulations are not
jurisdictional, and thus, the BIA cannot decline a motion to reopen on that ground).
231
See Isaacson, supra note 103.
232
The Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction comprises these states. See Court Locator, supra note 196.
233
473 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2007).
234
Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 659 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Lin, 473 F.3d at 982).
228
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Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit held in Coyt v. Holder that the regulatory departure bar rule is not applicable to aliens who were involunta235
rily removed from the United States. More recently, in Reyes-Torres
v. Holder, the court upheld its ruling in Coyt and reiterated that Congress’s intent in enacting IIRIRA is clear: “Congress anticipated that
petitioners would be able to pursue relief after departing from the
236
United States.”
In particular, the court held that 8 C.F.R. §
1003.2(d) did not deprive the BIA of jurisdiction to entertain ReyesTorres’s motion to reopen his case after being removed from the
237
United States.
Thus, the departure bar’s physical presence requirement is clearly inapplicable in cases where removal proceedings
have been completed and the alien has been removed. The Ninth
Circuit’s jurisdiction includes Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii,
238
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington.
9.

The Tenth Circuit Holds that Regulatory Departure
Bars Are Always Valid

The Tenth Circuit’s approach to departure-bar case law is in direct contrast to the Fourth Circuit’s. In Mendiola v. Holder, the Tenth
Circuit held that the departure bar in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) does not
conflict with the statutory language of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) and
239
therefore is a valid regulation applicable to departed aliens.
The
court recently upheld the departure bar’s validity once again in Con240
treras-Bocanegra v. Holder. In Contreras-Bocanegra, the court held that
the departure bar under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) divested the BIA of jurisdiction to hear petitioner’s motion to reopen despite the timeliness of said motion because the motion was filed after petitioner de241
parted the country.
Therefore, an alien who faces removal
proceedings in Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, or
235
593 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[Section 1003.2(d)] cannot apply to cause
the withdrawal of an administrative petition filed by a petitioner who has been involuntarily removed . . . .”); see Marin-Rodriguez, 612 F.3d at 594 (noting that the Sixth
Circuit is one of two circuits that hold departure bars inapplicable to involuntarily
removed aliens). See generally Susan Kilgore, Developments in the Judicial Branch: Ninth
Circuit Issues Decision in Coyt v. Holder, Invalidating Departure Bar on Motions to Reopen
and Creating Circuit Split, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 383 (2010).
236
645 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Coyt, 593 F.3d at 906) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
237
Id. at 1077.
238
See Court Locator, supra note 196.
239
585 F.3d 1303, 1308 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 502 (2010).
240
629 F.3d 1170, 1172 (10th Cir. 2010).
241
Id. at 1171–72.
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Wyoming is jurisdictionally barred from filing a motion to reopen or
242
reconsider after departing from the United States.
10. The Eleventh Circuit Upholds the Regulatory
Departure Bar as Valid
Sankar v. United States Attorney General is an unpublished opinion
243
addressing the applicability of the regulatory departure bar.
Ultimately, the court in Sankar specifically upheld the departure bar in 8
C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) as applied to motions to reopen or reconsider
244
before an IJ.
If the court’s analysis does not change, aliens who
were or are subject to removal proceedings in Alabama, Florida, or
Georgia, and have since departed will not be permitted to file mo245
tions to reopen or reconsider.
11. The Varying Approaches of the Circuit Courts of
Appeals
The aforementioned cases illustrate the lack of consistency in
the courts’ application of the departure bar and the recent trend
among the circuit courts of appeals of invalidating regulatory postdeparture bars. More importantly, the cases also highlight the
nuances in different circuit holdings of how narrowly or broadly the
provisions are interpreted. Such concerns indicate a need for change
in this context. The needed change, however, will require either a
Supreme Court ruling or an amendment to the INA’s statutory language.
VI. AN ARGUMENT FOR MODIFICATION OR ABOLISHMENT OF THE
REGULATORY DEPARTURE BAR
As evidenced throughout this Comment, there is a lack of uniformity among the U.S. circuit courts of appeals’ departure bar jurisprudence in the immigration context. Specifically, the circuit courts
are divided on the applicability and/or validity of the physical presence requirement in the departure bars—these “[d]ifferences in le-

242
243
244
245

See Court Locator, supra note 196.
284 F. App’x 798 (11th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 799.
See Court Locator, supra note 196.
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gal rules applied by the circuits result in unequal treatment of citi246
zens . . . solely because of differences in geography.”
In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee (“Study Committee”) examined inter-circuit conflicts and “recommended that the
Federal Judicial Center ‘study the number and frequency of unre247
solved conflicts’ to determine how many were ‘intolerable.’”
The
Study Committee’s report defined “intolerable” conflicts in the court
system to include circumstances when the lack of uniformity “encourages forum shopping among circuits [or] creates unfairness to litigants in different circuits . . . [or] encourages non-acquiescence by
federal administrative agencies, by forcing them to choose between
the uniform administration of statutory schemes and obedience to
248
the different holdings of courts in different regions.”
Given these
guidelines, the current regulatory departure bar conflicts in the different circuits are clearly “intolerable” conflicts.
Such longstanding conflicts are causes for concern, especially
considering the existence of Supreme Court Rule 10 (“Rule 10”),
which provides guidance for the Court’s discretionary power to
249
choose which writs of certiorari to grant. One guiding principle the
Supreme Court uses in considering a petition is whether a “[U.S.]
court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision
250
of another [U.S.] court of appeals on the same important matter.”
Interestingly, at least one commentator has said that Rule 10 is partly
derived from former President and Chief Justice Taft’s vision for the
Supreme Court; a vision that involved “two broad objectives: (i) to resolve important questions of law, and (ii) to maintain uniformity in
251
federal law.”
Although one commentator has noted that maintaining uniformity in federal law “has fallen by the wayside” since the retirement in

246

COMM’N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND
INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195,
206–07 (1975).
247
Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1582 (2008) (quoting JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U. S., FED. COURTS STUDY COMM’N, REPORT OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMISSION 124–25 (1990) [hereinafter FED. COURTS STUDY
COMM. REPORT]).
248
Id. (quoting FED. COURTS STUDY COMM’N REPORT at 124–25)(internal quotation
marks omitted).
249
SUP. CT. R. 10.
250
SUP. CT. R. 10(a).
251
Kenneth W. Star, The Supreme Court and its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William
Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1365 (2006) (emphasis added).
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252

1993 of Justice White —who openly advocated that a primary aim of
the Court is “to provide some degree of coherence and uniformity in
253
federal law throughout the land” —it is still an objective the Court
generally adheres to. As Justice Scalia noted, “The principal purpose
of this Court’s exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction is to clarify the
254
law.” Nonetheless, petitioning the Court to resolve an inter-circuit
conflict does not guarantee that the petition will be granted, but the
255
“likelihood that the Court will grant review increases markedly.”
Unfortunately, however, some conflicts among the circuits can
persist for years before the Supreme Court finally decides to hear the
256
matter.
Specifically, in the departure bar context, the Supreme
257
Court has rejected certiorari in at least three cases since 2008. It is
not clear at this point whether the Supreme Court will grant certiorari to clarify the matter at issue, especially since “relatively few immi258
gration cases are taken up by the Supreme Court.”
Additionally, as noted above, lack of uniformity may lead parties,
both governmental entities as well as private parties, to engage in forum shopping, and it certainly fosters less predictability in the law,
which raises questions of fundamental fairness concerning similarly
situated persons in different locations being treated differently under
259
the same laws. Such uncertainty also raises philosophical questions
260
Further, uniabout the overall effectiveness of our court system.
252

Id. See generally Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: White Announces He’ll Step
Down From High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1993, at 1.
253
Byron R. White, The Work of the Supreme Court: A Nuts and Bolts Description, 54
N.Y. ST. B. J. 346, 349 (1982).
254
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2274 (2009) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see, e.g., Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 7 (2008) (“[The Court] granted
certiorari . . . to resolve the disagreement among the Courts of Appeals.”); Whorton
v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 415 (2007) (stating that the Court “granted certiorari to
resolve th[e] conflict” among courts of appeals and state supreme courts).
255
Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, Setting the Social Agenda: Deciding to Review High-Profile Cases at the Supreme Court, 57 KAN. L. REV. 313, 319 (2009).
256
See, e.g., Bryan M. Shay, Note, “So I Says to ‘the Guy,’ I Says . . .”: The Constitutionality of Neutral Pronoun Redaction in Multidefendant Criminal Trials, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 345, 365 (2006) (“This relatively even split in the circuits persisted for almost
twenty years until the Court finally got the chance to settle the debate . . . .”).
257
Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 502
(2010); Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
502 (2010); Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 438 (1st Cir. 2007).
258
Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 27, at 49.
259
See supra text accompanying notes 23–27, 29.
260
For example, given the importance of maintaining uniformity throughout
American jurisprudence, as seen in the due process and equal protection clauses of
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form application of the law can improve judicial efficiency by limiting
the amount of resources that courts expend deciphering a law’s applicability when different circuits have such varying approaches to the
same issue.
First, forum shopping is a practice that our courts greatly des261
pise. For this reason, courts are encouraged to “consider the twin
aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoid262
ance of inequitable administration of the laws.” Litigants, however,
may undertake such gamesmanship when the legal environment provides them with the opportunity to receive a more favorable outcome
in a different jurisdiction.
Second, “[l]ack of predictability” is also of great concern; it is
“detrimental to citizens of foreign countries, citizens of the United
263
States, and to the United States as a country.” Such unpredictability
“may frustrate the reasonable expectations of litigants and lead to
264
disparate results across the states.” Instead, courts should strive to
achieve predictability because it “helps determine the precedent to
which a court should adhere, and it ‘encourage[s] reliance on adju265
dication.’”
In addition, predictability of the law can further assist
an attorney in advising clients and preparing clients’ cases.
Third, the current lack of uniformity leads to fundamental unfairness in our legal system. As indicated throughout this Comment,
an alien who was subject to removal proceedings in state A may be
unable to file a motion to reopen his or her proceedings, but would
be permitted to do so if he or she had faced removal proceedings in
State B. This is not a situation in which state laws mandate a variation
of results because different states have different laws or word those
laws differently. Rather, this is a situation in which federal statutory
law and federal regulations are interpreted differently although the
language contained therein is the same. As a result, similarly situated
persons in different areas are not treated the same.

the Constitution, should changes be made to the American court system so that such
inter-circuit conflicts do not persist for several years?
261
See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
262
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1448
n.2 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); Erie R.R. Co., 304 U.S. at 77–79.
263
Christina Manfredi, Comment, Waiving Goodbye to Personal Jurisdiction Defenses:
Why United States Courts Should Maintain a Rebuttable Presumption of Preclusion and Waiver Within the Context of International Litigation, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 233, 258 (2008).
264
Id. at 238 (internal quotation marks omitted).
265
Id. at 256–57 (quoting Estabrook v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 283, 289 (1998)).
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Finally, judicial efficiency may be improved by increasing uniformity in this context. Courts may be able to save limited resources
by not having to decipher what exactly the law in each circuit is or
will be. Lower courts will have more guidance and clarity to rule on
issues pertaining to motions filed by departed aliens. The BIA and
immigration courts may also experience an improvement in efficiency. As the BIA has explicitly indicated, it will apply the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of departure bar jurisprudence only in the
Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction. Thus, the BIA will continue to rely on
its own interpretation of the regulatory departure bars in other circuits. This practice may lead to more cases being overturned—if the
circuit does not agree with the BIA’s approach, as shown in Part
VII—which results in more litigation and greater use of resources.
Absent a Supreme Court ruling on the matter, in order to resolve
these concerns, Congress should modify the INA’s statutory language
or abolish regulatory departure bars entirely.
VII.

MODIFICATIONS AND AMENDMENTS

There are several different ways to modify or amend the language in the regulatory departure bars as well as the relevant INA statutes. This Part’s objective is to propose a modification or amendment that will result in uniformity among the circuits. For illustrative
purposes, this Part will use the language contained in the departure
bar under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d), which provides:
(d) Departure, deportation, or removal. A motion to reopen or a
motion to reconsider shall not be made by or on behalf of a person who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings subsequent to his or her departure from the United
States. Any departure from the United States, including the deportation or removal of a person who is the subject of exclusion,
deportation, or removal proceedings, occurring after the filing of
a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a
266
withdrawal of such motion.
266

8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (2011) (pertaining to the BIA).
In general . . . A motion to reopen or to reconsider shall not be made
by or on behalf of a person who is the subject of removal, deportation,
or exclusion proceedings subsequent to his or her departure from the
United States. Any departure from the United States, including the
deportation or removal of a person who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings, occurring after the filing of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall constitute a withdrawal
of such motion.
Id. § 1003.23(b)(1)(pertaining to Immigration Court).
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Similarly, this section will use the language contained in the INA
under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(A)–(C), which provides:
(c) Decision and burden of proof.
....
(7) Motions to reopen
(A) In general. An alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings under this section, except that this limitation shall not apply
so as to prevent the filing of one motion to reopen described in
subparagraph (C)(iv).
(B) Contents. The motion to reopen shall state the new facts that
will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted,
and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.
(C) Deadline.
(i) In general. Except as provided in this subparagraph, the motion to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of
267
a final administrative order of removal.

It is evident from the different circuit courts’ holdings that modifying the regulatory departure bars will not resolve all of the current
268
conflicts. As previously indicated, the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth,
and Seventh Circuits hold that the BIA either cannot constrict its
congressionally-granted jurisdiction or that the regulatory departure
bars are rendered invalid by the clear language found within the per269
tinent section(s) of the INA.
Each of the circuits, however, ac270
The
knowledges that the INA’s statutory language is controlling.
differences lie in how each circuit interprets this language. Therefore, a realistic solution to the current conflicts, absent a Supreme
Court ruling directly on point, involves amending the INA’s statutory
language.
There are two possible modifications that are most reasonable in
this context: one that includes statutory language requiring a geographic presence for all motions to reopen or one that includes statutory language explicitly stating that no such geographic presence is
required. Beginning with the former, such an amendment could include: (1) language contained in current regulatory departure bars,
in addition to explicit language to include (2) aliens who were the
subject of removal proceedings, (3) aliens who voluntarily departed

267

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)–(C) (2006) (additional provisions under subsection
(C) omitted).
268
See discussion supra Part V.
269
See discussion supra Part V.
270
See discussion supra Part V.
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the country, and (4) aliens who involuntarily departed. The amendment could be structured as follows:
(7) Motions to reopen.
(A) In general. An alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings under this section, except that this limitation shall not apply
so as to prevent the filing of one motion to reopen described in
subparagraph (C)(iv).
(i) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to an alien who is the subject of removal proceedings or was the subject of removal proceedings wherein a final order had been issued subsequent to his or her voluntary or involuntary departure from the United States. Any departure from the United
States, including the deportation or removal of a person who is the subject
of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings, occurring after the filing
of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a withdrawal of such motion.
....
(C) Deadline.
(i) In general. Except as provided in this subparagraph, the motion to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of
a final administrative order of removal.

Although such statutory amendment would resolve the conflicts
among all of the circuit courts, it would be contrary to Congress’s intent of improving the expedition of removing aliens in enacting the
271
The court in Coyt explained that the IIRIRA “‘inverted’
IIRIRA.
certain provisions of the INA, encouraging prompt voluntary departure and speedy government action, while eliminating prior statutory
272
barriers to pursuing relief from abroad.”
The court continued by
explaining that prior to the IIRIRA “removal of a petitioner from the
United States precluded courts from exercising jurisdiction over peti273
tions for review.”
Therefore, at the time when orders of final re274
The
moval were pending, aliens were granted automatic stays.
“IIRIRA changed that by lifting the prior statutory bar over courts exercising jurisdiction over departed aliens, removing the automatic
271
See Coyt v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Congress wished to expedite the physical removal of those aliens not entitled to admission to the United
States, while at the same time increasing the accuracy of such determinations.”).
272
Id. (quoting Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1755 (2009)); see also Espinal v.
U.S. Att’y Gen., 653 F.3d 213, 224 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting the “IIRIRA’s purpose of
speeding departure, but improving accuracy”); Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 101 (2d
Cir. 2011) (illustrating the same point as in Coyt by quoting the identical language
from Nken).
273
Coyt, 593 F.3d at 906.
274
Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(3) (repealed 1996).
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stay provision upon petition for review, and informing the Attorney
275
General that removal need not be deferred.”
The court in Coyt
then concluded that “the intent of Congress is clear” in that when
Congress enacted the IIRIRA it “anticipated that petitioners would be
276
able to pursue relief after departing from the United States.”
Additional insights into the IIRIRA’s structural meanings were
277
discussed in William v Gonzales. The majority in William made clear
that Congress’s use of the term “alien” does not distinguish between
aliens within or without the country; that Congress enacted limitations in the section at issue, but a geographical limitation for departed aliens is not included; and that Congress’s explicit physical re278
quirement under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(IV) would be
rendered superfluous if Congress already geographically limited mo279
Therefore, the amendtions to reopen or reconsider for aliens.
ment proposed above would be contrary to the IIRIRA’s original
purpose.
Perhaps then the more appropriate method to resolve the lack
of uniformity without frustrating the IIRIRA’s purpose or congressional intent would be an amendment to the statutory language that
explicitly states that an alien may file one motion to reopen whether
he or she (1) is the subject of or (2) was the subject of removal proceedings, regardless of whether the alien (3) voluntarily or (4) involuntarily departed the country. For example,
(7) Motions to reopen.

275

Coyt, 593 F.3d at 906; see IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 306(b), 110 Stat. 3009,
3009-612 (1996) (repealing 8 U.S.C. § 1105a); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(3)(B),
1252(b)(8)(C) (2006); see also Espinal, 653 F.3d at 224 (“Congress specifically withdrew the statutory post-departure bar to judicial review.”).
276
Coyt, 593 F.3d at 906 (emphasis added); see also Luna, 637 F.3d at 101 (stating
that Congress has done nothing since enacting IIRIRA to indicate “that an alien’s
departure after filing a motion to reopen should be a jurisdictional bar”); ReyesTorres v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Coyt’s language regarding Congress’s intent in enacting IIRIRA).
277
499 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 2007).
278
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(IV) (2006) (“(iv) Special rule for battered
spouses, children, and parents. Any limitation under this section on the deadlines
for filing such motions shall not apply. . . . (IV) if the alien is physically present in the
United States at the time of filing the motion.”)
279
William, 499 F.3d at 332–33; see also Espinal, 653 F.3d at 224 (providing similar
arguments in its reasons why “the post-departure bar regulation conflicts with Congress’ clear intent”); Luna, 637 F.3d at 101 (discussing Congress’s explicit physical
presence requirement for the domestic violence section and how “Congress’s choice
to include this limitation in only one small subsection makes significant its decision
to omit such a requirement from the rest of the law”).
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(A) In general. An alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings under this section, except that this limitation shall not apply
so as to prevent the filing of one motion to reopen described in
subparagraph (C)(iv).
(i) Subparagraph (A) shall apply to an alien who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings or was the subject of removal
proceedings wherein a final order had been issued subsequent to his or her
voluntary or involuntary departure from the United States. Any departure
from the United States, including the deportation or removal of a person
who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings, occurring after the filing of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall
not constitute a withdrawal of such motion.
....
(C) Deadline.
(i) In general. Except as provided in this subparagraph, the motion to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of
a final administrative order of removal.

This approach would essentially abolish the regulatory departure
bar rule by explicitly stating in the INA’s statutory language that an
alien who files a motion to reopen or reconsider his or her immigration proceedings is not be jurisdictionally barred from doing so solely
due to the alien’s geographic location. More importantly, such an
amendment could bring the needed uniformity in each circuit’s current approach to the departure bar’s application in the immigration
context. For example, the circuits that relied upon the Attorney
General’s discretionary power to issue regulations as the reason to
render such departure bars valid would no longer be able to uphold a
280
BIA’s or an IJ’s denial of a motion on such jurisdictional grounds.
In addition, the Ninth Circuit would no longer need to distinguish
between aliens who voluntarily departed the country and those who
281
were involuntarily removed.
Furthermore, the Second, Sixth, and
Seventh Circuits would now have clear guidance as to whether the
BIA retains jurisdiction to consider motions filed by aliens who have
282
departed. Finally, the Third and Fourth Circuits could continue to
uphold the statute itself as the final word on whether a court has ju-

280

See generally Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650 (2d Cir. 2010); Toora v. Holder, 603
F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2010); Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 502 (2010); Sankar v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 284 F. App’x 798 (11th Cir.
2008); Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 438 (1st Cir. 2007).
281
See generally Coyt, 593 F.3d 902.
282
See generally Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2011); Pruidze v. Holder, 632
F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2011); Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2010).
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283

risdiction to consider a motion to reopen filed by a departed alien.
Ultimately, this amendment or one that is similarly drafted would resolve each of the current inter-circuit conflicts while also conforming
to congressional intent not to impose a geographic limitation.
Such an amendment would provide uniformity in this immigration context that has been nonexistent for many years. “Given that
284
judicial efficiency and finality are important values,” the INA’s statutory language should be amended to provide greater uniformity in
this immigration context by explicitly stating that an alien may file a
motion to reopen regardless of whether the alien resides inside or
outside of the United States. The longer departure bar jurisprudence remains inconsistent, the longer certain parties may fall victim
to the concerns described in this Comment. Without a Supreme
Court ruling on this matter or a modification of the current law, the
problems detailed above will persist and aliens in certain jurisdictions
will continue to be removed without the possibility of having their
cases reheard.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

As departure bar jurisprudence currently stands, aliens subject
to removal proceedings in different areas of the country will face different outcomes, not based upon the merits of their cases, but solely
because of their geographic locations. Such lack of uniformity
presents problems in our legal system. This Comment has outlined a
few of these problems. One problem involves governmental agen285
cies, as well as private parties, engaging in forum shopping. Another problem, which common sense dictates, is that such a non-uniform
practice leads to lack of predictability in the law. This is probably
most troublesome in circuits that have yet to directly address the departure bar’s validity, as well as circuits where only unpublished,
286
nonprecedential decisions have been issued.
An attorney advising
his or her client in these jurisdictions has greater difficulty predicting
what the outcome may be or how the court will interpret the laws that

283

See generally Espinal v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 653 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2011); William v.
Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 2007).
284
Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 193, 197 (1996).
285
See supra Part I (discussing how DHS officials subjected Mendiola to removal
proceedings in a different circuit’s jurisdiction); see also SKINNER, supra note 27, at 1.
286
For a discussion of cases from circuits that have issued only nonprecedential
opinions regarding the departure bar, see supra Part V.C.
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are already in place. Our judicial system should strive to maintain a
framework devoid of such concerns.
An amendment to the INA’s statutory language explicitly stating
that physical presence is not required for departed aliens to file motions to reopen their proceedings would provide the clarity that circuit courts need in order to reach similar outcomes on identical issues. As such, an amendment to the INA’s statutory language that
explicitly grants immigration courts the jurisdiction to consider an
alien’s motion to reopen, regardless of whether the alien is within or
without the country, would both provide uniformity among the different circuit courts of appeals and remain true to the IIRIRA’s statutory purpose of expediting removal proceedings “while eliminating
287
prior statutory barriers to pursuing relief from abroad.”

287

Coyt v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 2010).

